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NOTES.
The war has caused a falling off of approximately 70 per cent.
in the attendance at the Law School and the consequent reduction
of the Editorial Board to one-third its normal size.
As already announced to our subscribers, of whose loyalty we
have since then had abundant evidence, we find it impossible under
the circumstances to publish more than four, instead of the usual
eight, numbers during the current scholastic year.
Owing to the small size of the board there will necessarily be
a reduction in the amount of editorial matter, but members of the
Faculty will from time to time contribute notes signed by them.
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LAW REFORM AND THE WAR-One of the outstanding results of
the war is disregard for precedent and the application of common
sense and expediency in adapting means to ends. The individualism
which was the boast of Americans only a short time ago has been
supplanted by a kind of state socialism directed by all-powerful dictators who administer affairs with very little regard to the so-called
"inalienable" rights of the individual. We are accepting orders
from which there is no appeal, commanding us to do or not to do
things which heretofore were left entirely to individual initiative.
The American citizen is thus receiving a training far-reaching in its
consequences.
Is it possible that these things shall not be felt in the field ot
law and of legal administration?
During the last decade, noteworthy progress in volume and intensity has been made toward the reform of law and procedure. The
organization and publications of the American Judicature Society
to promote the efficient administration of justice, the reports of committees of the American Bar Association and of local bar associations, discussions in learned societies devoted to political and social
science, the reform instituted in Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, California, Massachusetts and other states, the proposed reforms advocated by the leaders of the bar in New York and
Mississippi, the constant discussion at meetings of the state and
local bar associations through the United States, newspaper agitation, the long bibliography of procedural reform, all indicate that
criticism of our law and procedure which a generation ago was confined almost exclusively to the layman has been taken up by the legal
administrators and experts themselves.
Much of this is due to the work of the better law schools of the
country whose teachers have fostered a spirit of free and critical
inquiry through presentation of the law to their students not only
as it is, but as it ought to be.
This was the condition at the outbreak of the war. And now
it is more than probable that the example set during this world
conflict, which brushes aside every plea and every precedent that
would obstruct the translation of need into action, will further
stimulate the already powerful movement toward legal reform
throughout our country, and that with the close of the war a determined and irresistible impulse will have been given to that reforming tendency whose aim is to unify the law, to adapt it more
closely to the needs and actual conditions of society and to simplify
legal procedure. One of the most significant phenomena attendant
upon this change of attitude is the character of the criticism levelled
a sacro-sanct institutions by their own administrators. Judges and
lawyers boldly speak of nonsensical and outworn rules which they
themselves are obliged to administer, they criticise most unflinchingly and unsparingly the procedure of the courts in which they
themselves are the officials, and they advocate the tearing down and

NOTES

reshaping of much of the system which they or their predecessors
have helped to build up. When criticism of this character emanates
from such sources we may expect radical changes in the effort to
adapt the law to the new conception of its relation to society.
David Werner Amram.
Is A TAXICAB COMPANY

A COMMON CARRIER?-A

common car-

rier of passengers is one who undertakes for hire to carry all persons who may apply for such service.' It is not necessary that the
carriage should be over a definite route nor at specified intervals.
Thus, it has been held from an early period that hackmen are common carriers.2 The undertaking to serve the public generally is
evidenced by their occupying stands on the streets, by the display
of signs, or by otherwise signifying a readiness to carry all who
apply. Baggage transfer companies are likewise common carriers 3
In accordance with the above principles and by analogy to the
case of hackmen and transfermen, it follows that taxicab companies
are common carriers. This was so decided in two cases, one in
Missouri 4 and the other in West Virginia,2 where the question of
the liability of the taxicab company was in issue. The West Virginia court thus described the position of the company: "Defendant followed the business of transporting persons for hire from one
part of the city to another, and held itself out to serve one and all
who should apply to it for transportation upon payment of the
fares agreed upon and usually charged :-this being true, it is of
course a public or common carrier of passengers." So far as the
right to regulate the duties of a taxicab company are concerned, it
was decided in a Supreme Court case 6 in New York that a municipal ordinance relative to public hackmen applies to taxicabs, it
being well recognized in New York that hackmen who profess to
serve the public generally are common carriers.
'Thompson, Carriers of Passengers, 26; Gillingham v. Ohio River R. Co.,
35 W. Va.588 (i8gi). This is in accord with the historic definition of a common carrier of goods: "Any one undertaking for hire to carry the goods of
all persons indifferently is a common carrier." Gisbourn v. Hurst, i Salk.
249 (171o).
"From time immemorial ithas been held that the business of a public
hackman isaffected with a public interest and falls within the principle of
the common law which was long ago asserted by Lord Chief justice Hale in
his treatise De Portibus Maris." Seabury, J., inthe Taxicab Cases, 143 N.
Y. Sup. 279, 289 (1913). See also Munn v.Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 125 (1876);
Bonce v.Dubuque Street Ry.Co., 53 Iowa 278 (188o).
116 (1874). A moving van company has
'Parmelee v.Lowitz, 74 Ill.
been held inPennsylvania to be a common carrier. Lloyd v.Haugh,223 Pa.
148 (i9o9).
4VanHoeffen v.Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo.App. 59, (913).
'Brown Shoe Co. v. Hardin, 87 S.E. 1014 (I916).

'The Taxicab Cases. T43 -X.Y. Sup. 279 (913).
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In a recent case I in New York the question arose whether a
taxicab company is a common carrier, so as to enable a person who
was injured while riding in one of its cabs to obtain double indemnity from an accident insurance company under a policy which provided for the payment of such indemnity where "the bodily injury
is sustained by the assured while in a public conveyance provided by
a common carrier for passenger service." The plaintiff and a companion entered the taxicab at a street corner, where the company
maintained a public stand and office. The trip was an ordinary one
to another part of the city, and the injury occurred while the plaintiff was attempting to alight from the taxicab at his destination. The
court decided that the taxicab company was not under the circumstances a common carrier, and that consequently the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover double indemnity from the insurance company. This result was reached on the following grounds: (i) That
the defendant company had the right to refuse carriage to "'any
objectionable person, because of condition, appearance, disease, or
for any other proper or legal reason"; (2) that the taxicabs were
not operated on any "defined or definite route"; (3) that the plaintiff and his companion had the exclusive right to occupy the taxicab until their destination was reached. The court cited in support
of its decision a Tennessee case,8 where a similar decision was
handed down without an opinion, and a United States Supreme
Court case,9 where it was held that in so far as a taxicab company
furnished cars from its central garage on orders, which it claimed
the right to refuse, it was not a common carrier, such service being
regarded as similar to that of a livery stable.
The reasons given and the authorities cited are not sufficient
to support the decision in the New York case under discussion.
The right to refuse persons who are objectionable because of dis-.
ease or other legal reason is possessed by all common carriers."
The fact that the carriage is not over a definite route is not material,
for, as already pointed out, this quality is present in the case of
hacks and transfer companies. The assumption that the plaintiff
had the right to occupy the vehicle exclusively is not determinative
of the question. Mr. Justice Holmes in the United States case cited
by the court regarded this right as consistent with the position of
the company as a common carrier." Furthermore, there seems to
be no difference, so far as the right to exclusive occupancy is concerned, between taxicabs and hacks.
'Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 166 N. Y. Sup. 64o (1917).
'Darnell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 46 Ins. L J. 523 (I915).
'Terminal Taxicab Co., Inc., v. Kutz, 24r U. S. 252 (i915).
' Pullman Co. v. Krauss, 145 Ala. 395 (r9o6), (disease) ; Pittsburg, etc.,

R. Co. v. Van Dyne, 57 Ind. 576 (1877), (intoxication) ; Atchison, etc., R. Co.
v. Weber, 33 Kan. 543 (i885), (violent conduct) ; Stevenson v. West Seattle
Land Co., 22 Wash. 84 (I9OO), (obscene language).
'Terminal

Taxicab Co.. Inc., v. Kutz, 241 U. S.

252, 254

(1915).

NOTES

The authorities relied upon by the court are of little weightthe Tennessee case, because the decision was accompanied by no
opinion, and the United States case, because the situation there was
different, as the cabs in question did not occupy public stands on
the streets, but were obtained from the garage by order only.
A question somewhat similar to that of the New York case
arose in a recent case in Pennsylvania. 2 Here the plaintiff, who
was injured while riding in a taxicab was permitted to recover
double indemnity under a policy, which stipulated that such
indemnity should be paid when the injury occurred in "a public conveyance, provided for passenger service and propelled by steam,
gasoline, etc." This statute differs from the one in the New York
case in not specifying that the "public conveyance" is to be provided
by a "common carrier." This difference, however, is more apparent
than real, for it would seem to follow on principle that a conipany
operating a public conveyance was in that connection a common carrier. Although it is not clear from the opinion whether the court
considered that the plaintiff and his party had the right to occupy
the taxicab exclusively, 13 their reasoning appears to be broad
enough to cover the facts of the New York case, and they probably
would have decided that the defendant company in that case was a
common carrier.
Both on principle and by analogy to hack and transfer companies, taxicab companies occupying public stands on the streets
or otherwise holding themselves out to serve the public should be
held to be common carriers for all purposes.
Edwin R. Keedy.

TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENE---"LAST CLEAR CHANCE"-

In practically every common law jurisdiction it is held as a general
proposition of law that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
destroys his right to recover from an equally negligent defendant,
or at least operates to reduce the damages which should be awarded
to him, but in practically every common law jurisdiction it is equally
true that the plaintiff by his pure negligence, exposing himself to
the risk of the injury, does not forfeit under all circumstances his
right to damages for the injuries caused him by another. It is uni'Primrose v. Casualty Co. of America, 232 Pa. 210 (19i1).
'Two statements of the court on this point are apparently conflicting:
(i) "Those who rode in them . . . were as much passengers in them as
they would have been if riding in a specially chartered car of a railroad
company from which all but themselves were excluded." (2) "The use of
no one of its machines was limited to any particular person, but anyone able
to pay the price for riding in it, while it was under the control of and being
operated by one of the company's employees, could do so."
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versal law that a person who deliberately takes advantage of an opportunity which another has negligently afforded him to inflict injury upon such other is liable to compensate him for the harm which
he intentionally inflicts."
In many jurisdictions contributory negligence is no bar to the
recovery of damages caused by the wanton misconduct of another.'
In so far as the conduct is really wanton, in so far as it is characterized by conscious indifference to the obvious risk which it creates, this is nothing more than a recognition that mere inadvertence does not excuse conscious or deliberate wrongdoing. In the
great majority of American jurisdictions as well as in England, it
has for years been accepted law that a defendant, who after discovering a plaintiff in a position of helpless peril into which his
own negligence has put him, continues to act without taking such
precautions as are then possible and so brings injury upon the
plaintiff, is "solely" responsible for the ensuing harm.
Many of the jurisdictions which profess to allow recovery to a
negligent plaintiff only where the defendant's act is wanton or wilful, reached substantially this same result by branding as wanton a
failure to take ordinary precautions to avert the accident when the
plaintiff's helpless peril is discovered. 4
A number of American jurisdictions have held that, where the
relation between the plaintiff and defendant is such that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to be on the lookout to discover whether the plaintiff is or is not in a position of danger, the
defendant is as fully responsible if he could and should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless, though negligent, peril, in time to
avert the accident as when he knew of it.5 It is impossible in the
short space of a note to discuss the causes which have led to these
views.

It may be said, however, that the thought underlying them is
that the defendant, who could, but did not, avert the catastrophe
after he did or should have known of its imminence, is to be regarded as the ultimate final or decisive cause of the accident. It
follows from this view that in the crisis the plaintiff must not be able
'Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (i88o); Birmingham, etc., Co. v. Jones,
146 Ala. 277 (i9o6); Wynn v. Allard, 3 W. & S. 524 (Pa. r843).
'Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367 (I9O4); Alger, Smith & Co. v. Duluth
Superior Trac. Co., 93 Minn. 314 (1964); Md. B. & W. R. R. v. McBrown,
46 Md. 229 (1874).
'Iowa Cent. R R. v. Walker, 203 Fed. 685 (1913); see cases cited in
note to that case, Bohlen's Cases on Torts, p. z387.
"Parsons, J., in Cavanaugh v. B. & M. R. L, 76 N. H. 68 (Ig91) ; Smith
v. N. & S. R. P., 114 N. C. 728 (1894) ; Cole v. Metro. St. Ry., 121 Mo. App.
605 (19o6); Rawitzer v. St. Paul City Ry., 90 Minn. 84 (19o4)'; and see Ga.
R. Co: v. Lee, 92 Ala. 262 (i8go).
' Teakle v. San Pedro, etc., R. R., 32 Utah 276 (I9o7) ; and cases cited in
the notes to that case in Bohlen's Cases on Torts, pp. 1387-1390.
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to control the situation, and that the defendant shall have the power
to do so. Therefore, the majority of jurisdictions hold that where
the plaintiff had the physical ability, if he had been upon the alert,
to avoid the accident, he cannot recover against a defendant who had
a similar physical ability, but who also through inadvertence did
not realize the necessity of using it.6
So a plaintiff, who without taking any pains to observe
whether a car is approaching upon a level crossing, walks upon it,
is not allowed to recover from a defendant railway, whose engineer
or motorman is guilty of a like inadvertent failure to observe his
danger.7
There are, however, some jurisdictions which seem to believe
that defendants owe plaintiffs a higher degree of vigilance than
the paintiffs owe to theistlves, and hold that a plaintiff who
is in full possession of his faculties, but who in a moment of carelessness walks, without looking, directly into the path of an oncoming car or train may recover, though the only fault alleged
is his failure to observe that
against the driver of the car or train
8
the plaintiff is drifting into peril.
In the great majority, if not all of these cases, however, there
are two features: ist, the ensuing collision harms only the plaintiff; thus, creating that sympathy which the primitive law showed
to the injured man-a sympathy which still subsists in many juries,
and, as these cases show, in some courts; 2nd, the defendant is a
corporation carrying on a business, which, though necessary to the
public, is primarily conducted for the profit of the corporation and
its stockholders, and the accident happens upon a public highway
or other place upon which private travelers had originally an exclusive right, but over which these corporations are permitted, because
of their public utility to carry on, in derogation of the originally
exclusive right of the ordinary public, a business which, unless conducted with the utmost care is bound to create a considerable risk
to their use of the highway. It may well be that this situation has
led the court to-instinctively feel that a company exercising peculiar
rights over a previously public way and conducting thereon a business dangerous in the highest degree, unless conducted with the
most scrupulous care, should be held to the highest standard
of diligence and vigilance. While there is this diversity of opinion
above noted, there is a substantial unanimity in holding that
the plaintiff by his negligence must have put himself in a posiIFrench v. Grand Trunk R. R., 76 Vt.441 (19o4) ; and cases cited in notes
to that case in Bohlen's Cases on Torts, pp. 1390-1392.
'

French v. G. T. R., supra.

' Birmingham L. & P. Co. v. Brantley, 141 Ala. 614 (1904) ; Cons. R. Co.,
v. Rifcowitz, 89 Md. 338 (i899); Murphy v. Wabash, 228 Mo. 56 (I9io) :

Hutchinson v. St. Louis, etc., R. R., 88 Mo. App. 376 (i9o1 ; Lassiter v.
Raleigh, etc., R. R., 133 N. C. 244 (913); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Haymns.
112 Tenn. 712 (1904).
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tion in which he is physically helpless, or he must by such obvious
inattention or absent-mindedness indicate that he cannot be expected to control the event, and that the defendant must, at the time
when he did or could have observed the plaintiff's peril, have had
the ability to avert the accident. So the overwhelming weight of
authority in America is to the effect that a precedent act of negligence, whether of commission or omission, whereby the defendant
has put it out of his power to avert the accident after discovering
that it is impending, does not make him responsible to a plaintiff
who has, through his negligence, exposed himself to the peril, and,
this is so though the plaintiff's negligence consists not merely of an
inadvertence or absent-mindedness which precludes him from exercising his power of self-protection, but is some more or less deliberate act which placed him in a helpless position in the path ot tne
danger.9

In a recent case, British Columbia Rwy. Co. v. Loach,0 the
British Privy Council decided that a defendant is the sole responsible cause of an accident, if a precedent act of negligence, which
itself occurred long before the plaintiff's negligence, has made unavailing the obviously proper precautions which the defendant's
agent took to avert the accident when he was first able to perceive
that it was imminent. In that case a man named Sands, the plaintiff's decedent, who was driving with a friend, was run down and
killed at a level crossing by a car of the railway company. Neither
he nor his friend appeared to have seen the car until they were so
close to the crossing that they could not stop in time to prevent the
collision. There were no circumstances which could have excused
their failure to see the car. Their view was unobstructed and there
was plenty of light. Thus, they were unquestionably guilty of contributory negligence in driving upon the crossing in the face of a
peril, which the least use of their senses would have shown them. The
driver of the car appears to have seen the wagon approaching the
crossing while the car was still so far from it that, had the brakes
been in good order, he could have stopped it in time to prevent
the collision. He attempted to do so, but the brakes being out of
order the car did not stop and the collision occurred. It also appeared that the car was running at an excessive speed.
Lord Sumner, who delivered the opinion of the Privy Council,
said in answer to the argument that if the defendant's negligence
continued up to the moment of the collision, so did the deceased's
contributory negligence, "The consequences of deceased's contributory negligence continued, it is true, but, after he had looked, there
was no more negligence, for there was nothing to be done
and his contributory negligence will not disentitle him to re'Trow v. Vermont Central R. I., 24 Vt. 487, and cases cited in the notes

to that case in Bohlen's Cases on Torts, p. 1394, 1392.
i T A. C. Reports (i916) 719.
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cover if the defendant might by the exercise of care on his part
have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of the
plaintiff."
He adopts the opinion of Anglin, J., in Brenner v. Toronto
Railway Co., 11 to the effect that "where a situation of imminent
peril has been created, either by the joint negligence of both plaintiff
or defendant, or it may be by that of the plaintiff alone, in which,
after the danger is or should be apparent, there is a period of time of
some perceptible duration during which both or either may endeavor to avert the impending catastrophe, and notwithstanding the
difficulties of the situation, efforts to avoid injury L7uly made would
have been successful, but for some self-created incapacity which
rendered such efforts inefficacious, the negligence which produced
such a state of inability is not merely the part of the inducing causes
-it is, in very truth, the efficient, the approximate, the decisive
cause of the incapacity, and therefore of the mischief. Negligence
of a defendant incapacitating him from taking due care to avoid
the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, may, in some cases,
though anterior in point of time to the plaintiff's negligence, constitute 'ultimate' negligence, rendering the defendant liable notwithstanding a finding" of contributory negligence of the plaintiff."
Those jurisdictions which have taken the so-called humanitarian view and allowed recovery where both the plaintiff and defendant are equally able to avert the accident, and are equally guilty
of inadvertence continuing until the opportunity to control the event
is over, might very properly take the same final step. They have
already substantially repudiated the'theory that recovery is permitted only where the defendant's negligence is subsequent to that
of the plaintiff. Having imposed upon the defendants a superior
duty of vigilance, they may well go further and insist that they
maintain their equipment in such condition as to make such vigilance effective. Otherwise, as Lord Sumner said in British
Columbia Railway Co. v. Loach,12 "the defendant company would
be in a better position where they had supplied a bad brake but a
good motorman, than where the motorman was careless but the
brake efficient."
Francis H. Bohlen.
TORTS-TRESPASS-AcTION

FOR

THE DEATH

OF A

HUMAN

BEING-A recent case in England I has again brought up that apparent anomaly in the common law that there may be no civil
action for the death of a human being, though there may be for an
13 Ontario Law Reports 423.

'2 Note 9,supra.
1

Admiralty v. S. S. Amerika,

1917

A. C. 38 (Eng.).
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injury not resulting in death. The first reported case to hold this
is Higgins v. Butcher.2 This was an action of trespass by a man
for the beating of his wife, whereof she died. But the court compared it to the case of a servant who had been killed. The next
case is Baker v. Bolton,8 decided by Lord Ellenborough. In this
case also a man was suing for damages from the death of his wife.
This rule was apparently never questioned until 1873, when Brainwell objected to it in a dissenting opinion in Osborn v. Gillett.' Here
the death of a daughter was complained of. However, this case was
5
followed in Clarke v. London Omnibus Co., another case of the
8
States I have also
United
the
death of a daughter. Canada and
accepted this as the common-law rule.
There has been much discussion as to the reason for the rule.
On the face of it, it seems absurd that a man can recover for an
injury to his servant or a member of his family not resulting in
death, but may not for an injury resulting in death. The greater
injury would seem to be the latter, and should be recompensed if
any was. We do find the suggestion that the reason is the impossibility of adequately compensating for a person's death. But again
we suggest the absurdity of refusing any damages merely because
enough cannot be given.
Bevan 8 advances the interesting theory that the rule arose before the Black Death when servants were abundant and were hired
by the year. An injury to one resulting in sickness or disability
caused expense to the master; whereas if one was killed it was a
very easy matter to find another, and there were no damages. This
however hardly explains why one could not recover for the death of
a wife or child.
The rule is sometimes referred to as coming'vithin the maxim
"actio personalis moritur cum persona!" But here the person
bringing the action is not the one who is dead, but another who
has been injured because of his relation to the dead person, and the
maxim is clearly inapplicable.
Tanfield in Higgins v. Butcher, as reported by Yelverton,9 gives
as the reason for the rule that the felony drowns the offense. This
has given rise to the theory that there was a rule of public policy
which forbade entirely a civil action for a felony. If such were the
case it would also be applied to larceny or burglary. But the true
rule is that the right to bring a civil action is suspended until after
'Noy 18 Yelv. 89 (Eng. 4, Jac. I).
31 Camp. 493 (Eng. i8o8).
'L. R. 8 Exch. 88 (Eng. i87;3).
(19o6) 2 K. B. 648 (Eng.).
'Monaghan v. Horn, 7 Can. S. C. R. 407
'Ins. Co. v. Bramne, 95 U. S. 754 (1877).
' Bevan, Negligence (3rd Ed.) I: z82.
'See note 2, supra.

(1892).
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the criminal prosecution. This being satisfied, trespass could be
brought for what in fact amounted to burglary 10 or larceny, provided
the additional facts required to make the trespass a felony were
not alleged. The defendant would not be allowed to plead his own
felony as a bar to the action!i But where death resulted from the
act of the defendant, the ground of complaint could not be alleged
without alleging felony, for at that time every homicide was a felony.
Trespass would not lie for a felony. "For the king alone is to punish
felony, except the party bring an appeal."' 2 The nature of the action
of trespass itself and not any rule of public policy prevented it from
being brought for the death of a person.
Another theory for this rule that trespass will not lie for the
death of a human being is discussed by Lord Sumner in Admiralty
v. S. S. Amerika.'3 Trespass was an action primarily for injuries
to one's personal rights. Among these was the right to the service
of one's wife, or daughter, or servant. This was based not upon any
contract, but upon the status between them. Therefore, when anyone injured one's wife or servant, so that her services were lost to
the husband or master, an action would lie for the loss during the
continuance of the disability. But when the wife or servant died,
the status was ended. One had no right to the services of a dead
person, nor had a husband or master any right to the life of his
wife or servant. Hence with the death the injury ceased and no
action would lie for subsequent damages. If the death was immediate it was "damnum absque injuria." "Whether or not this be
the theory on which those who introduced these causes of action
would have justified them, as indeed we may be sure it is not, it
at any rate provides, though somewhat imperfectly, an intelligible
basis for the existing rule sufficient to prevent your Lordships from
interfering with long-standing decisions on the plea that they are
insensible or arbitrary." So Lord Sumner himself regards this
theory as only an afterthought.
We must in all probability turn to the history of the development of the action of trespass to find the true explanation for the
rule. For a long time in England homicide was an emendable
offense, which could be satisfied by the payment of bot to the kinsfolk
of the dead man, and wite to the king. When this system became
too elaborate and burdensome it rapidly fell into disuse. Its place
was taken by the criminal prosecution for offenses against the king's
peace, and the new action of trespass for damages from personal injuries. The writ of appeal persisted for felonies for a long time
'Markham v. Cob, Noy 82 (Eng. 1625).
Lutterell v. Reynell, i Mod. 252 (Eng. i67o).
"Higgins v. Butcher, Noy i8.
" See note i, supra.
"Admiralty v. S. S. Amerika, at 55, see note i, supra.
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before it was superseded by the indictment. This private action
gave the relatives of the person killed the personal satisfaction
which trespass gave for minor injuries. The wrongdoer was
punished and the relatives took part in the punishment. As late as
the reign of Henry IV they were allowed to drag the body of the
appellee to the place of execution.15 As the king gained greater
power he was able to enforce a forfeiture of the goods of a felon.
This prevented the appellant from obtaining any satisfaction, except
the purely sentimental gratification derived from participation in the
execution. This lack of substantial satisfaction, together with the
ecclesiastical ban upon the ordeal, the necessity for the appellant
to prosecute the appeal in person, the right of the appellee to force
a trial by battle, and the severe punishment for a false appeal, caused
this action to become more and more unpopular. It had to be
brought within a year and a day of the death. For a long time indictments were not allowed to be brought within that time lest appeals be discouraged. After this rule was abolished, an appeal was
allowed to be brought after the indictment, even though there
was an acquittal, though an appellee, if acquitted, could not later
be indicted. However, the writ of appeal came to be used only as
means of blackmail and rapidly fell into disfavor, though not
actually abolished until I819, after the famous case of Ashford v.
Thornton. 6
The action of trespass developed while the writ of appeal was
still used. That action giving a remedy for all wrongs amounting
to a felony, the action of trespass was only used for lesser injuries;
for the law would not multiply actions for the same offense. By
the time the writ of appeal ceased to be used the action of trespass
was well established within certain limits, among them that it would
not lie for a felony. At the time trespass developed, any killing of
a human being was a felony. The modem distinction between murder, manslaughter, and excusable or justifiable homicide did not
grow up until sometime after the indictment took the place of the
appeal. The slayer was left on the king's mercy if there were the
attenuating circumstances which now excuse or justify. Hence
trespass would not lie for any death. This limitation upon the
action still persisted, though the original reason for it no longer
existed. Thus an examination of the historical development of the
action of trespass offers a logical explanation of the apparent
anomaly.
A very interesting discussion of the Roman, French and Spanish
authorities on this same point may be found in the Louisiana cases,
'54 Blk. 316.
is r B. and Al. 405 (Eng. 1818).
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Hugh v. R. R., 17 and Hermann v. R. R. 8 In neither case were
counsel able to persuade the court that the civil law differed from
the common law.

E.N. V.
1'T6 La. Ann. 495 (185z).

iii

La. Ann. 5 (1856).

